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MODERN WAR AND THE VALIDITY OF TREATIESt
A COMPARATIVE STUDY
Richard Rank*
There has of late been a recrudescence of the old doctrine that war
ipso facto terminates all treaty obligations between belligerents. This
view, which is still adhered to by some European courts,' was rejected
by the United States over one hundred thirty years ago.2 The problem
of the status of prewar treaties is particularly important now. Al-
though eight years have gone by since the cessation of World War II
hostilities, major peace treaties are still lacking.3 Yet, questions involv-
ing the private rights of individuals under prewar treaties are arising
and must be solved. For this reason, and because of the doubts
being sown by the reappearance of the absolute abrogation doctrine, the
principles governing the effect of war upon treaties seem to deserve
examination.
I. INTRODUCTION: THE SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM
The fact that modern war is total war is the basis upon which recent
writers have concluded that absolute abrogation of treaty obligations
must result. Thus, the attorney for respondents in Clark v. Allen said:
.. the last World War was total war, and it must be realistically acknowl-
edged that it penetrated every field of human conduct and activity. We
cannot ignore the very real effect it had on treaties entered into during
a time of peace.6 (Italics added.)
And further:
The clear and avowed objective of the United States in entering the re-
cent war was the complete destruction of the German State, with no dis-
tinction made as to its government and people. ... This was a war to the
death.6 (Italics added.)
t The first of two installments the second of which will appear in the summer issue
of Volume 38.
* James Fellow in Comparative Law, Cornell University. See Contributors' Section,
Masthead, p. 390, for biographical data. The author wishes to thank Professors Rudolf
B. Schlesinger, Michael H. Cardozo, and Gustavus H. Robinson for their encouragement
and advice in the preparation of this article, and gratefully acknowledges the editorial
assistance of Mrs. Delores Orey, Class of 1954, Cornell Law School.
1 E.g., French and some German courts. See the second installment of this article.
2 Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. New Haven, 8 Wheat. 464 (U.S. 1820).
a Though peace treaties have been signed with Italy, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria
and Finland in 1947, and with Japan in 1951, see the second installment of this article,
there is as yet no peace treaty with Germany and Austria.
4 These include questions as to the ownership of property, right to bring an action,
inheritance, trade marks, copyrights, judicial assistance, etc.
6 Brief of Attorney General of California as amicus curiae, p. 9, 331 U.S. 503 (1947).
6 Brief for respondents, p. 9, 16, 331 U.S. 503 (1947).
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From this premise it is reasoned that treaties concluded during time
of peace cannot remain valid. The same idea was recently expressed
in a law review comment that characterized the American judicial doc-
trine (which has generally upheld the validity of treaties during war)
as a generous one that
... does not seem to take into consideration the modern nature of war
and . . .also seems to forget that modern wars are as much supported
by the civilian population as by the armed forces.7
Apparently, the author of that comment considers it inconceivable that
one country should wish to confer the advantages of peace upon the other
in time of war, even those advantages concerning private rights. Ac-
cording to this view, the slate is clean at the end of the war, and the
victorious powers are free to impose a new network of treaty obliga-
tions.
Pushed to its logical conclusion, the theory of absolute abrogation
would require that even treaties intended to come into force only during
war be annulled by a state of war. As Mr. Justice Washington said
in rejecting the absolute abrogation doctrine, "If such were the law
• . . [it] would be so monstrous as to supersede all reasoning. ' 8 I sub-
mit that total war does not necessarily conflict with the preservation
of treaties between belligerents. A war is a war, and there is no legal
difference between one war and another. What is meant by total war
is greater intensity in warfare and the use of more developed means of
destruction. It does not and should not necessarily mean obliteration
of all legal relations between belligerents2
There are, furthermore, strong practical reasons for rejecting the ab-
solute abrogation doctrine, especially when the broad scope that mod-
ern war often attains is kept in mind. International society could not
exist without a legal basis, that is without treaties and agreements to
protect and regulate the intercourse of nations. There are roughly
fifteen thousand treaties in existence,"0 regulating a vast area of human
7 51 MIcH. L. REv. 566 (1953).
8 Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. New Haven, 8 Wheat. 464, 494 (U.S.
1820).
9 See RAmK, EmvnruN6 DES KEwES Au DIE NicTinOLiTiscnEN STAATSVERTRAEGE
15 et seq. (Uppsala 1949); Scheuner, Die v~lkerrechtlichen Auswirkungen des modernen
Wirtschaftskrieges, 104 ZEirscmurr rtiR Dm GESA TE STAATSivISSENSC1EAFT 237 et. seq.
(1944); Jessup, International Law and Totalitarian War, 35 Am. J. INT'L L. 329 et seq.
(1941).
10 It is difficult to give the exact number of existing treaties, but in 1939 there were
roughly 13,000 (see RANK, op. cit. supra note 9, at 21). There are at present 2,554 treaties
registered with the United Nations (information from Mr. W. W. Cox, of the Treaty
Division of the United Nations, dated Feb. 26, 1953).
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activity. Among them are treaties regulating international transport by
rail, sea and air-to make the transfer of goods from one country to
another safe, simple, and speedy. The Universal Postal Union has vari-
ous conventions to aid the dispatch of letters, money, newspapers, and
packages, from one country to another. There are treaties regulating
inheritance, commerce, shipping, fishing, bird migration, radio broad-
casting, international telecommunications, health and sanitation, double
taxation and finances, exchange of official publications, purchase of
rice, sugar and wheat surpluses. There are treaties prohibiting traffic
in narcotics, establishing weather stations, protecting copyrights, pro-
viding for the extradition of criminals, relief assistance, exchange of
agricultural workers, issuance of passports and visas, constituting of
international organizations like the International Labor Organization
and the International Institute of Agriculture. These are just a few
examples to illustrate the vast scope of human activity regulated by
treaties. It seems unfortunate, therefore, to adopt a practice, which, as
the war spreads, requires the automatic nullification of a larger and
larger segment of the pre-existing treaty network. It would, at the very
least, be an enormous and complex task to negotiate anew on every
aspect of this enormous area, comparable in some ways to attempting
to replace an area governed by common law completely by statute, or
to completely replacing one of the civil codes.
Even if the difficulty of negotiating new treaties to cover all these
subjects were overcome, a legal vacuum would be left, not only during
the period of hostilities, but even after hostilities cease, until the pro-
posed new agreements were negotiated and had come into effect."
These treaties, which are designed primarily to regulate the conduct
of the signatory powers for the benefit of their nationals and residents
individually, are commonly known as "lawmaking" or nonpolitical
treaties. It is sometimes argued that all treaties have essentially a
"political character", 12 because every act is political that involves rela-
tions between states. Whatever may be the exact meaning of "politi-
cal" in this connection, there are some treaties of the type which Sir
Arnold D. McNair designates as "purely political."'' 3 These are treaties
which embody some political arrangement such as an alliance, a guar-
11 Thus, problems like the one in the Clark case would be incapable of settlement,
and even when peace treaties were negotiated, it would be necessary that they apply
retroactively.
'2 BARAND0N, DAS SYsTEM DER POLTxISCn= STAATSVERTRXG 3 (1937); WACHIE, SYSTEM
DER PArTE. Dmi POnSCHEN- VERTRXOE DER NAcHK:RiEszEiT 11 (1938).
Is McNAiR, THE LAW Or TREATIES 548 (1938).
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antee, or an undertaking to remain neutral, to arbitrate or assist. The
existence, power, and greatness of a state is central in these treaties.
However important purely political treaties may be from the point of
view of the state, they are far less numerous than nonpolitical treaties,
and they do not generally present difficult problems concerning their valid-
ity in time of war; the parties usually agree, expressly or impliedly, that
these treaties will be terminated. They also do not present a problem
to the practising lawyer because individual rights rarely arise under
them, as they do, for example, under an inheritance treaty.
Nor do treaties that are specifically concluded to regulate the con-
duct of hostilities, 4 and that come into force only during war, present
any problem of theoretical interest. The conclusion that war results
in their automatic abrogation would be logically absurd, and it seems
that no state has ever advanced this theory. When states have vio-
lated these treaties, they have used other reasons to excuse themselves,
but not the argument that these treaties are not in effect because of the
outbreak of the war. 5 The Geneva Convention of 1949"s specifically
provides that a denunciation declared by a party at war shall not take
effect until peace has been concluded.
Treaties concluded between belligerents during time of war are as
valid as those concluded to regulate the conduct of war, since the par-
ties by contracting during a war manifest an intention to create rights
and obligations between themselves.
14 For example, the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, MA Lo Y, TREATIES, CONVEN-
TIONS, ETC. BETWEN THE UNITED STATES Or AmERICA AND OTBER PowERs 2017, 2220
(1910). Accord, the Case Rieger, French Court of Cassation, July 29, 1948, DALLoz HEB-
DOMADAREE 1, 193; In re Friess and Ronnenberger, French Court of Cassation (Chambre
Criminelle), April 17, 1947, [1947] DALIoz HEBDOiADAE E 333. See also Monaco, Les
Conventions entre belligerents, 75 REC uEm DES CouRs, AcAD9= DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL
(hereinafter RCADI) 273 (1949-II).
15 See a German case The Naphtha Shipper, Prize Court of Hamburg, October 14,
1939, 6 HAcxwoRTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 569 (1943), where the court used
an alleged denunciation by Great Britain to justify its refusal to apply the Sixth Hague
Convention of 1925.
16 Article 142, U.S. GEN. FOREIGN PoL. San. No. 34 (Dep't State 1949); RrVUE INTE-
NATIONAL DE LA CROIX-ROUGE (1949).
17 Examples of this type of convention are agreements concluded during World War II
between the United States and Germany for direct repatriation and hospitalization in a
neutral country of prisoners of war for health reasons, signed at Washington, March 4
and 30, 1942, 56 STAT. 1507 (1942); Agreement between Great Britain and Germany
on repatriation of severely wounded prisoners (see RAN:, op. cit. supra note 9, at 16);
another concerning provision of prisoners of war with postal packages (see Postal and
Counter Work During War-Time, L'UNioN POSTALE 162 (1946)); and an agreement be-
tween, Germany and France on reciprocal protection of copyrights (see RANK, op. cit.
supra note 9, at 16).
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The discussion which follows is mainly limited to the "lawmaking"
treaties in time of war and after. It will deal first with the fundamental
principles manifested in treaty provisions, and, then, examine recent
developments in the application of those principles by the political de-
partments of governments, in the new peace treaties, and by the courts.
II. TREATY PROVISIONS: THE BASIC DOCTRINES
The Doctrine of Intention
Since treaties are by nature agreements between sovereign nations,"
and since consent is the central and most important basis for the con-
clusion of treaties, the intention of the parties is logically of paramount
importance in deciding whether a treaty is terminated either in war-
time or in peacetime. This approach has long been recognized in this
country and in England. In Allen v. Markham"9 the United States cir-
cuit court of appeals said:
. .. the question of whether or not ... the treaty remains in effect during
the war depends upon the intent of the high contracting parties as ex-
pressed in the treaty .... 20 (Italics added.)
In an English case, Marryat v. Wilson,21 Chief Justice Eyre said:
We are to construe this treaty as we would construe any other instrument
public or private. We are to collect from the nature of the subject, from
the words 4nd from the context, the true intent and meaning of the con-
tracting parties, whether they are A. and B., or happen to be two inde-
pendent states.22
On the European continent, the importance of the intention of the par-
ties has not been generally recognized, except by the Swiss courts.
1) Express intention that the treaty remain in force between the par-
ties during the war between them: If the language of the treaty clearly
expresses the intention that the treaty is to remain in force in case of
war between the parties, the treaty must be regarded as in force, whether
it is political or nonpolitical. This position has a very long standing
in history.
18 Rainey v. United States, 232 U. S. 310 (1913); Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447
(1913); Altman v. United States, 224 U.S. 583 (1912); United States v. Rauscher, 119
U.S. 407 (1886); Whitney v. Robertson, 114 U.S. 583 (1880); Frederickson v. Louisiana,
23 How. 445 (U.S. 1859); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1 (U.S. 1831); Worcester
v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515 (U.S. 1832); Techt v. Hughes, 229 N.Y. 222, 128 N.E. 185 (1920),
cert. denied, 254 U.S. 643 (1920); The "Wimbledon", P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 1, 21 (1923).
19 156 F.2d 653 (9th Cir. 1946), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 331 U.S. 503 (1947).
20 Id. at 661.
21. 1 Bos. & P. 430, 126 Eng. Rep. 993 (1799).
22 Id. at 439, 126 Eng. Rep. at 997.
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The Treaty of Saint Germain of 16791 contained a provision whereby
the parties agreed that the treaties of Westphalia were to remain in
full force even during war. Though the absolute abrogation doctrine
was prevalent at this time, the treaties of Westphalia remained in
force during the entire century which followed, because of the express
stipulation of the parties.
Article II of the Treaty of Paris of 1763 provided that "... the
treaties of Westphalia of 1648 and . . . [sixteen other treaties which
are listed] which subsisted between the High Contracting Parties
before the war are... confirmed in all their points. 24 (Italics added.)
In 1799 in the Treaty of Amity and Commerce the parties (the
United States and Prussia) expressed their intent in Article XXIV as
follows:
And it is declared, that neither the pretence that war dissolves all treaties,
nor any other whatever, shall be considered as annulling or suspending
this and the next preceding article . . .and during [the state of war]
... they are to be as sacredly observed as the most acknowledged arti-
cles in the law of nature and nations.25
Article XXVII stipulated that the treaty was to remain in force for
ten years, providing however:
...if the expiration of that term should happen during the course of a
war between them, then the articles before provided for the regulation of
their conduct during such a war, shall continue in force until the con-
clusion of the treaty, which shall restore peace.
This treaty, which expired by its own terms in 1810, was revived in
part by Article XII of the Treaty of May 1, 1828.26 The latter, at least
in part, has been passed upon and held unaffected by World War I be-
tween the United States and Germany" It was superseded by a. new
treaty in 1923,28 which also has been held to have survived World War
11.29
The Convention Instituting the Statute of Navigation of the Elbe,3"
23 Article 4, 7 DUmONT, CORPS DIPLOmATIQuB ET UNIVERSEL DE DROIT DES GENs 408
(1731).
24 1 MARTENS, RECUFIL DES TRAITiS 33 (1791).
2 8 STAT. 162 (1855); 2 MALLoY, TREATIES, CONVENTIONS etc. 1486 (1910).
26 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Prussia, 2 MAL-
Loy, TREATIES, CoNVENT Ns etc. 1946, 1499 (1910).
27 The Sophie Rickmers, 45 F.2d 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1930); Kansas v. Reardon, 120 Kan.
614, 245 Pac. 158 (1926); Goos v. Brocks, 117 Neb. 750, 223 N.W. 13 (1929).
28 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights with Germany, signed Decem-
ber 8, 1923, and proclaimed October 14, 1925, 44 STAT. 2132 (1927).
29 Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947).
80 26 L.N.T.S. 219, 241 (1924).
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concluded between Germany, Belgium, Great Britain, France, Italy
and Czechoslovakia, signed at Dresden in 1922, provided for the applica-
tion of the convention in time of war "to the fullest extent compatible
with the rights and duties of belligerents and neutrals." (Article 49).
Article III of the Convention Relative to the Establishment and
Maintenance of a Lighthouse on Cape Spartel of 18651 contained an
express provision for respecting the neutrality of the lighthouse and
continuance of payment for its upkeep, even if hostilities broke out
between the parties.
The same intention of the parties that the treaty remain in force
during time of war is stipulated for in various treaties governing the
free navigation of rivers. 2 In these treaties, an exception is made con-
cerning articles of contraband, which are not permitted free passage.
A very good example which shows that it is the parties themselves
and not war which abrogates treaties is the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty
of 1386,S' which is still in force. Article XI provides that a serious
and unauthorized violation of the Treaty (an open war on the other
party) shall entitle the injured party either to denounce the treaty,
or without doing so, to take steps to obtain redress. Thus, the treaty
remains in force according to its terms, despite a war, and is abrogated
only by action of one of the parties, if the party decides to denounce.
Perhaps the most striking example for our case is the Russo-Dutch
Loan Case of 1854. By a convention between Great Britain, the Nether-
lands and Russia made in 1815,"4 the two former powers agreed to
assume responsibility for equal parts, of both capital and interest, of
a certain Russian loan raised on the Dutch market, and accordingly to
make certain payments to Russia. Great Britain received as considera-
tion four colonies (Cape of Good Hope, Demerara, Essequibo, and
Berbice). Article IV provided that the payments by the Nether-
lands and Britain "shall not be interrupted in the event (which God
forbid) of a War breaking out between the three High Contracting
31 55 BaRisn AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 16, 18 (1870). 20 MARmws, N.R.G., 1st
Ser., 350.
32 E.g., General Act of Berlin of February 26, 1885, concerning Navigation of the
Congo (Article 25) and the Niger (Article 33), 76 BTIsH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPEs
4, 17 and 19 (1892), 10 MARTENS, N.R.G., 2d Ser., 414; Treaty of St. Jos6 de Flores of
July 10, 1853 with reference to free navigation of the River Plate, 10 MARTENs, N.R.G.,
2d Ser., 294; Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, signed at Parani on March 7,
1856; see further Winiarski, Principes g~n~raux du droit fluvial international, 45 RCADI
183 (1933-IH); Accioly, Freedom of River Navigation in Time of War, 19 IOWA L. REv.
231, 234 (1933-1934).
33 1 BRisH AND FOREGN STATE PAPERS 468 (1841).
34 2 BRTiSH AxD FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 378 (1841).
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Parties; the Government of the Emperor of All the Russias being
actually bound to its Creditors by a similar agreement." During the
Crimean War the British Government, despite parliamentary opposition,
and despite the war, continued her payments under the agreement.,
The following conclusions seem to be suggested by these examples.
War, in the first place, is no more than a circumstance which, in certain
cases, justifies the denunciation of treaties. The determination of when
such justification exists is a question of international law. War in itself
possesses no inherent characteristic that requires an automatic and
generally abrogative effect on treaties. Treaties remain in force unless
they are denounced or are terminated pursuant to an express or implied
provision in the treaty itself. Those treaties that provide that a party
may denounce it if war breaks out indicate that it is the parties them-
selves and not war, as such, that terminates treaties.
It is of course possible that a state may espouse the principle that
war ipso facto terminates treaty obligations, as we shall see France has,
for exaiple. But again it is important to realize that this result follows
from the decisions of the political department of the government and
is not compelled by any peculiar feature of the nature of war. And
furthermore, whether such a decision is justified will in many instances
be determined by an international tribunal. We are free, therefore,
to examine the proposition that war abrogates all treaties upon its
merits as a principle under which international relations should operate
and to accept or reject it on that basis alone. It is the purpose of this
study to show that if the theory of absolute abrogation were adopted
or if it should be generally recognized as a principle of international
law it would unnecessarily jeopardize the complicated and sensitive
machinery of international relations to the general detriment of the
society of nations.
2) Express intention that the treaty be abrogated or suspended dur-
ing the war: Just as in the case in which the expressed intention of
the parties is that the treaty remain in force, the intention that the
treaty be abrogated or suspended should be followed where it is clearly
expressed. In this case, also, it is not war, but the intention of the
parties that abrogates the treaty.
The Convention Relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation
of 1919,"6 the Convention on International Civil Aviation of 1944," '
35 McNAm, TH LAW or TREATIEs 530 (1938).
36 11 L.N.T.S. 174, 197 (1922); 13 MARTms, N.R.G., 3d Ser., 61.
37 T.I.A.S. 1591, pp. 31 (1947).
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and the Commercial Aviation Convention between the United States of
America and other American Republics88 contain provisions of this
type.
Various conventions limiting the hours of work, such as the Con-
vention Limiting the Hours of Work in Industrial Undertakings to
Eight in the Day and Forty-eight in the Week of 1919,"9 the Conven-
tion Limiting Hours of Work in Commerce and Offices of 1930,1o and
the Convention Limiting Hours of Work in Coal Mines of 1931,1
have provisions suspending their operation in time of war, or other
emergency endangering national safety.
Conventions governing freedom* of transit are among those having
these provisions. Thus, Article 8 of the Statute on Freedom of Transit,42
concluded at Barcelona in 1921, and Article 15 of the Statute on the
Regime of Navigable Waterways of International Concern,' concluded
at the same time, provide that:
This Statute does not prescribe the rights and duties of belligerents and
neutrals in time of war. The Statute shall, however, continue in force in
time of war so far as such rights and duties permit.
Article 7 of the Statute on the Regime of Navigable Waterways of
International Concern provides for a provisional suspension during an
emergency other than war. In the Convention Ensuring the Freedom
of Transit and Navigation of the Straits between the Mediterranean
Sea and the Black Sea,44 concluded at Lausanne, July 24, 1923, there
is a provision that Greece and Turkey have the right to suspend their
obligations under the treaty, and it is provided expressly that the
obligations are reestablished as- of the conclusion of peace.
Suspension in case of war has also been provided for in the Treaty
Limiting Naval Armament, signed at Washington in 1922.' This
treaty provides for a meeting to consider modifications, on the cessation
of hostilities.
In conclusion, it is submitted that the insertion of suspension or
38 T.I.A.S. 840 (1931).
39 Article 14, 1 Hujsox, INTERNATIONAL LEGIsLATIoN 392, 402 (1931).
40 Article 9, 5 id. at 626, 631 (1936).
41 Article 16, 5 id. at 1029, 1036 (1936). This provision does not mention war, only
an emergency endangering national safety, but its application to war may be inferred.
42 7 L.N.T.S. 13, 29 ((1922); 18 MARTENs, N.R.G., 3d Ser., 618.
43 7 L.N.T.S. 37, 61 (1922); 18 MARTENS, N.R.G., 3d Ser., 709. For more details see
CORTHISY, ]TUDE DE LA CONVENTION DL BARCELoNE suR s LE REGI8E - DES VoIEs NAVIGABLES
D'INTER-T INTERNATIONAL (1927).
44 Article 9 of the Annex, 117 BRITIsH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 592, 598 (1926).
45 Article 22, 3 MALLOY, TREATIES, CONVENTIONS, etc. 3100, 3114-15 (1923).
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abrogation provisions is a further indication that war does not of itself
terminate treaty obligations. These provisions would be unnecessary if
this were the case.
3) Ascertaining the intention of the parties when it is not clearly
expressed. Although there are many treaties in which the parties ex-
pressly indicate their intention whether the treaty is to remain valid or not
during time of war, most treaties do not have express provisions. The
parties have either regarded specific provisions on this point unnecessary,
or have simply forgotten to consider the point. It is in these cases, that
the real difficulty arises. What is, or perhaps more correctly speaking,
what was the intention of the parties? Did they intend the treaty to
remain in force during a war between them, or did they intend suspension,
or even abrogation?
It is generally accepted that it is for the courts to interpret treaties4
As the determination of the intent of the parties is of primary import-
ance in contract law, and the intent of the legislature in interpretation
of statutes, so the principal guide of the courts in the interpretation of
treaties is the intention of the parties
It is the duty of the court to resort to all available means to discover
the intention of the parties. In Allen v. Markham," the United States
Circuit Court of Appeals laid down the rule that the interpretation must
be customary:
However, basically the question of whether or not Article IV of the
46 United States v. Domestic Fuel Corp., 71 F.2d 424 (Ct. Cust. & Pat. App. 1934);
The Francis Louise, 1 F.2d 1004 (D. Mass. 1924), appeal dismissed sub nom. United
States v. Backman, 270 U.S. 666 (1926); The Sophie Rickmers, 45 F.2d 413 (S.D.N.Y.
1930); Frasca v. City Coal Co., 97 Conn. 212, 116 Atl. 189 (1922); San Lorenzo Title &
Improv. Co. v. Caples, 48 S.W.2d 329 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932). For the scientific litera-
ture in regard to treaty interpretation see JOEL, DE L'Irr-'RAiTAnToN DES TRAITfS
NorrATIr S PAR LA DOCTRINE ET LA JURISPRUDENCE INTERNATiONALES (1936); Castberg,
La Mithodologie du Droit Internationale Public, 43 RCADI 326 (1933-1); Ehrlich,
L'interpritation des Trait~s, 24 RCADI 5 (1928-IV); Kelsen, Zur TIreorie der Inter-
pretation, REvuE INTERNATIONAL 9 (1932-1933); Wright, The Interpretation of Multi-
lateral Treaties, 23 Aa. J. INT'L L. 97 (1929); CHANG, THE INTERPRETATION OP TREATIES
BY JUDIcIAL TRIBUNALS (1933); Lauterpacht, Restrictive Interpretation and the Principle
of Effectiv'eness in the Interpretation of Treaties, 26 BRIT. Y. B. INT'L L. 48 (1949); HARv.
RESEARCH, LAW or TREATIES 937-997 (1935).
47 Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947); Valentine v. United States, 299 U.S. 5 (1936);
Todok v. Union State Bank, 281 U.S. 449 (1930); Nielsen v. Johanson, 279 U.S. 47
(1929); Wright v. Henkel, 190 U.S. 40 (1903); In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891); Chew
Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536 (1884); The Amiable Isabella, 6 Wheat. 1 (U.S.
1821); Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 199 (U.S. 1796); In re Estate of Anderson, 166 Iowa
617, 147 N.W. 1098 (1914), aff'd sub. nom. Peterson v. Iowa, 245 U.S. 170 (1917); Bondi
v. MacKay, 87 Vt. 271, 89 Atl. 228 (1913).
48 156 F.2d 653 (C.C.A. 9th, 1946), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 331 U.S. 503 (1947).
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treaty remains in effect during the war depends upon the intent of the
high contracting parties as expressed in the treaty, or as implied there-
fron by the customary interpretation of such agreements by nations gen-
erally. It is important therefore to consider the relation of the United
States and Germany at the time the Treaty of 1925 was negotiated, and
when ratified and confirmed in 1925, as indicating their intent.49 (Italics
added.)
Just what these rules of customary interpretation are, the court does
not say, though it indicates one of them: the situation of the parties
at the time the treaty was concluded."° There are, however, well
established principles laid down by previous holdings.
First, when the language of the treaty clearly expresses the meaning
of the parties, no other means of interpretation can be employed. Other-
wise, the intent of the parties is to be gathered from the letter and the
spirit of the treaty, taking into account the situation of the parties
and the object of the provisions being interpreted.P1 Treaties protecting
private rights are to be liberally construed. Mr. Justice Story said in an
estate case decided in 1830:
If the treaty admits of two interpretations, and one is limited, and the
other liberal; one which will further, and the other exclude private rights;
why should not the most liberal expositions be adopted? 2
The Supreme Court of the United States has repeatedly said that
treaties, in general, are to be interpreted liberally, so as to carry
out the intention and purpose of the partiesPa
In the Clark case, 4 the Court tried to find the intention of the
parties as of the time the case was before it, and not at the time of
the making of the treaty. Mr. Justice Douglas said:
We have no reliable evidence of the intention of the high contracting par-
ties outside the words of the present treaty. The attitude and conduct
under earlier treaties, reflecting as they did numerous contingencies and
conditions, leave no sure guide to the construction of the present treaty.
49 Id. at 661.
6o Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423 (1943); Todok v. Union
State Bank, 281 U.S. 449 (1930); Sullivan v. Kidd, 254 U.S. 433 (1921); Bondi v. Mac-
Kay, 87 Vt. 271, 89 At. 228 (1913); see also Hurst, Effect of War on Ti'eaties, 2 BRIT.
Y. B. INT'L L. 37, 39 (1921-22).
51 Ware v. Hylton, 3 DalU. 199 (U.S. 1796).
152 Shanks v. Dupont, 3 Pet. 242, 249 (U.S. 1830).
53 Hauenstein v. Lynhan, 100 U.S. 483 (1880). See also United States v. Pink, 315
U.S. 203 (1942); Bacardi Corp. v. Don~nech, 311 U.S. 150 (1940); Todok v. Union State
Bank, 281 U.S. 449 (1930); Nielsen v. Johanson, 279 U.S. 47 (1929); United States v.
Payne, 264 U.S. 446 (1924); Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258 (1890); United States v.
Auguisola, 1 Wall. 352 (U.S. 1863).
54 331 U.S. 503 (1947).
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Where the relevant historical sources and the instrument itself give no
plain indication that it is to become inoperative in whole or in part on
the outbreak of war, we are left to determine . . . whether the provision
under which rights are asserted is incompatible witkh national policy in
time of war 5 (Italics added.)
National policy with regard to treaties will be determined by the
executive and political departments of the governmentY6 It is interesting
to note that Justice Douglas speaks of incompatibility with national
policy, and not incompatibility with a state of war, as the true test
of whether the treaty remains in force. This test, which is based on
the present intent of the parties, is used because of the absence of other
sources of interpretation.
In ascertaining the meaning of a treaty provision, United States
courts have looked beyond the written words to the negotiations and
diplomatic correspondence of the parties. 7 Especially as far as the
practice of international tribunals is concerned," it is a well established
rule that so-called preparatory work, travaux prdparatoires,9 may be
resorted to in order to find the intent of the parties. This material
includes the negotiations preceding the conclusion of a treaty, the
minutes of the plenary meetings and of committees of the conference
which adopts a convention and the successive drafts of a treaty. For
example, the minutes of the Barcelona Conference on Communication
and Transit of 1921 show clearly the intent of the parties that the
treaty provisions not be abrogated by war, but only suspended." Al-
though there is no case on record in which the preliminary negotiations
and correspondence of the parties have been used to ascertain their in-
5 Id. at 513.
-6 Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276 (1933); Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447
(1913).
57 Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423 (1943); Arizona v. Cali-
fornia, 292 U.S. 341 (1934); Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276 (1933); Nielsen v.
Johanson, 279 U.S. 47 (1929); Jordan v. Tashiro, 278 U.S. 123 (1928); Universial Ad-
justment Corp. v. Midland Bank, 281 Mass. 303, 184 N.E. 152 (1933).
58 A good survey of this topic is contained in HumsoN, TnE PER.MMENT COURT OF
IxTERNATiONAL JusTicE 1920-42 (1943); See also LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPIMT
Or INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE PERM!ANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTIcE (1934);
Wright, Tte International Court of Justice and the Interpretation of Multilateral Treaties,
41 Am. J. INT'L L. 445 (1947).
69 Lauterpacht, Les travaux pr~paratoires et l'interpritation des Trait s, 48 RCADI
713 (1934-11); SPENCER, L'INTERPRfTATION DES TRAITs--PAR LEs TRAVAUX PR-PARATOIRES
(1934) ; Lauterpacht, Some Observations on Preparatory Work in the Interpretation of
Treaties, 48 HARV. L. REv. 549 (1935).
60 BARCELONA CoNFERENCE oN Cos uNmcATioNs AND TRANsIT, VERBATnth REPORT 106
(1921).
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tent with regard to the effect of war on treaties, no reason appears why
this material could not be examined for that purpose. The Permanent
Court of International Justice was never called upon to decide a case
involving the effect of war on treaties, and there has been no case on
this point before the new court, the International Court of Justice.
The Doctrine of Legal Order
1) A treaty creates rights and imposes obligations: In the preced-
ing section I have tried to show that in determining the validity of a
treaty during time of war, the controlling factor should be the intention
of the parties, and that, when the intention of the parties is not ex-
pressed or ascertainable, the courts are called upon to discover by
way of interpretation the hypothetical intention of the parties. In the
latter case, however, there is a danger of subjectivity and therefore
uncertainty regarding the final outcome. The judge is left wide and
uncontrolled discretion-an entirely subjective criterion-to find the
hypothetical intent of the parties. Or it may even happen that it is
impossible for the court to find the intention of the parties, because
they appear to have had conflicting intentions. It is clear therefore
that, where express intention of the parties is lacking, some more
objective criterion is needed for the judge to decide upon the validity
of a treaty during a war.
A treaty when concluded, that is duly signed, ratified, declared, and
registered, confers rights and imposes obligations on all parties con-
cerned. In this sense a treaty is more than the mere expression of
the intention of the parties.0 1 It creates, so to speak, a legal order
between the parties, which is in force independently of the individual
wills of the parties concerned.6 2 Chief Justice Jay, when speaking in
I1 In the United States a treaty is more than a contract between nations. Foster v.
Neilson, 2 Pet. 253 (U.S. 1829); Commonwealth v. Hawes, 13 Bush (Ky.) 697 (1878);
Little v. Watson, 32 Maine 214 (1850); Minnesota Canal, etc. Co. v. Pratt, 101 Minn.
197, 112 N.W. 395 (1907). By force of the Constitution of the United States all treaties
made shall be the supreme law of the land, the judges in every state shall be bound there-
by, and they are superior to any state constitution or law. Maiorano v. Baltimore and
Ohio R.R., 213 U.S. 268 (1909); De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1900); In re Cooper,
143 U.S. 472 (1892); United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886); Hauenstein v.
Lynbam, 100 U.S. 483 (1880); Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dal]. 199 (1796). Treaties are equiva-
lent of an act of Congress. The Head Money Cases (Edye v. Robertson), 112 U.S. 580
(1884); Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536 (1884).
62 According to the legal view of the United States a treaty may give rise to private
rights which are of such a nature as to be enforceable by the courts for the benefit
of private parties, and in such case the courts resort to the treaty for a rule of decision
as they would to a statute, Maiorano v. Baltimore and Ohio R.R., 213 U.S. 268 (1909);
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Jones v. Walker63 of the principles which govern and decide the validity
of a treaty, said that "it rests not on the volition of the other, but on
that perfect obligation which contracts authorize and not improperly
impose on both the parties"6 4  (Italics added). The same is true
of internal law: as soon as a legal rule has come into being-whether
it comes from the legislature or the courts or any other recognized
source of law-it acquires a life of its own, and takes its place in a
system of rules.
A treaty once concluded becomes a part of the international legal
system and its validity during a war is dependent, if the parties have
not expressed their intention to the contrary,, upon the validity of the
international legal system generally. The order created by a treaty
between belligerents is not obliterated by war, not even by "total"
war. This order is violated by a war, but there is no reason to assume
that the whole system of treaties will be abolished. I submit that the
idea of Montesquieu, that in war nations are under an obligation to
do as little harm as possible to each other just as in peace they are
obliged to do the greatest good,65 should also be applied to modern
"total" wars. This liberal view was the basis for a codification of
existing rules on the subject by the Institute of International Law, and
was expressed by the Rapporteur in his report as follows:
The rule that treaties continue in force appears as the corollary of the
modern conception of war which, itself an increasingly exceptional phe-
nomenon, must be limited in its effects. The international order in which
the belligerents were living is not swept aside. It is only provisionally
modified in the small measure necessary to the achievement of the war
aim, that is to say the victory of the stronger. Outside these limits ordi-
nary legality continues to exist, together with rules deriving from custom
and with those, increasingly numerous, laid down by treaties. To retain
the old principle of the abrogation of treaties as the necessary effect of
war, would be to run counter to the tendencies of our time.66
United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886); The Head Money Cases (Edye v. Rob-
ertson), 112 U.S. 580 (1884); Teti v. Consol. Coal Co., 217 Fed. 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1914);
Erickson v. Carlson, 95 Neb. 182, 145 N.W. 352 (1914); Trott v. State, 41 ND. 614,
171 N.W. 827 (1919); In re Estate of Arduino, 9 Ohio N.P.N.S. 369 (1909); Bondi v.
MacKay, 87 Vt. 271, 89 Atl. 228 (1913). In Palermo v. Stockton Theatres, Inc., 32
Cal. 2d 53, 195 P.2d 1 (1948), the court held that the Commercial Treaty with Japan of
1911, although abrogated, was still valid as municipal law.
63 13 F.Cas. 1059, No. 7, 507 (Va. Cir.). The reporter gives no date. Jay was Chief
Justice from 1789 to 1795.
64 Id. at 1062.
65 "Le droit des gens est naturellement fondi sur le principe que les nations doivent se
faire dars la paix le plus de bien, et dans la guerre le moins de mal qu'il soit possible,
sans nuire a leurs viritables intir&ts". 1 MONTESQUIET, ESpRiT DES LoIs c. III.
66 24 ANNUriAmE DE L'INSrITUT DE DROIT INTEmRATioxAL 200, 207 (1911). See also
25 id. 611 (1912).
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It is in the interest of all parties concerned that the system which the
treaty established, be maintained until the end of war, when a new
system can be decided upon, which will take into consideration the
intervening circumstances.
2) No difference between bi- and multilateral treaties: A distinction
is frequently made by the political departments of governments and
by some writers between bilateral and multilateral agreements in de-
termining the effect of war on treaties. I question whether there exists
a logical and legal difference between a multilateral and bilateral treaty
that warrants the automatic abrogation of bilateral but not of multi-
lateral treaties in time of war. Both bilateral and multilateral treaties
create rights and impose obligations equally without any consideration
regarding the number of signatories; both become a part of the exist-
ing international legal system. The only difference between them seems
to be that a bilateral treaty creates a legal order with a narrower field
of application, being limited only to two states, whereas a multilateral
treaty has a much broader application. This difference, however, if
it is the only one, seems insufficient to justify the holding that war
dissolves bilateral but not multilateral treaties. It is therefore sub-
mitted that the number of signatories to a treaty has no effect on its
legal nature or its continued existence during war, bilateral treaties
having the same validity as multilateral ones.67
3) A state of fact cannot terminate a legal order: A legal order
created by a treaty is of course subject to all the vicissitudes of a social
upheaval and can thereby become inoperative during such periods but,
once order is restored, if circumstances are otherwise unchanged, it
will resume all its previous social, and therefore juridical, validity.68
The doctrine that war automatically terminates treaties is from this
point of view indefensible because a state of fact, i.e., war, cannot
terminate a legal order created by a treaty. A legal order can be
terminated only by some legal act, that is, by the concurring wills of
the parties concerned, which will be in the form of a new agreement.69
To hold otherwise means the acceptance of the doctrine that "might
is right", which is really the basis of the abrogation doctrine. But
67 In Clark v. Men, 331 U.S. 503 1947), a bilateral treaty creating a "legal order" be-
tween Germany and the United States in matters of commerce and consular rights, was
held to be in force and effect during the whole period of war and even not "suspended"
between Germany and United States because of war, having thus the same validity as,
for instance, a multilateral postal or sanitary convention.
68 Scelle, De l'influence de l'ttat de guerre sur le droit conventionnel, 77 JoURNAL Du
DROIT INTERNATIONAL 26, 41 (1950).
69 RANx, op. cit. supra note 9, at 68.
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this doctrine is not sound. If war ipso facto abrogates treaties, why
should it not also abrogate the customary law between belligerents, i.e.,
the other main source of international law? International customary
law, however, remains intact and is not wiped out by war.7" Therefore,
from the lawyer's point of view only the doctrine of the continued
validity of the legal order is acceptable. The treaty remains in force
if the intent of the parties to the contrary cannot be ascertained.
To sum up: the doctrine of legal order is essentially the doctrine
of pacta sunt servanda and the doctrine of the status quo. It does not
permit treaty denunciations without legal grounds, still less the pre-
sumption of automatic abrogative effect of war on treaties.
The Doctrine of Changed Conditions
It is a common occurrence for wars, especially those that are wide-
spread, to result in changes in the international legal order. The ques-
tion has been raised, however,
• ..whether it is analytically helpful to consider "the effect of war on
treaties" as a distinct legal problem. [I]t is not the existence of "war"
as such, but rather the existence of any condition, such as hostilities,
whether recognized as "war" or not, or any other grave emergency, that
may within the design of the parties justify the suspension of the opera-
tion of a treaty provision2 1
It is submitted that "the effect of war on treaties" is not a distinct
legal problem from the point of view of the intention doctrine, because
it is not war, or any other emergency situation which abrogates treaties,
but the parties themselves. War may of course give the parties an
impetus to disregard the treaty.
It might be both theoretically and practically better therefore to
consider the problem of whether the changes brought about by a war
(or any other grave emergency) in the existing status quo would auto-
matically warrant the invocation of a doctrine known in international
law as the doctrine of changed conditions or rebus sic stantibus.72 Be-
70 Speaking of the experiences of World War II, JFssuP, A MoDERN LAW oF
NA iONS 215 (1948), says that "it is erroneous to deduce ... as is sometimes done, that
the old distinction between civilians and military personnel has been abandoned. Women
and children are not deliberately shot when an attacking force enters a town, as are
members of the enemy armed forces who do not surrender." Those who are guilty of
individual atrocities will be punished as war criminals.
71 See Oliver J. Lissitzyn, Book Review, 45 A.e. J. INT'L L. 205, 206 (1951).
72 Probably the first modem formulation of the doctrine was given by 3 SPxozA,
TRAcTATUs THEoLoGico-PoLrnicus, 14, as follows: Neino in futurum contrahit nisi
positis praecedentibus circumstantis. His enim mutatis totius status etiam mutatur ratio.
(No one makes a contract for the future except on the hypothesis of certain preceding
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fore I venture an answer it might be helpful to briefly review this
doctrine.
The doctrine of changed conditions is an attempt to formulate a
legal principle73 that will justify nonperformance of a treaty obligation
if the conditions with relation to which the parties contracted have
changed so materially and so unexpectedly as to create a situation in
which the exaction of performance would be unreasonable.74
A recent invocation of this doctrine adopted the outbreak of war
as the changed condition justifying nonperformance. During the second
World War, but before the United States was a belligerent, President
Franklin D. Roosevelt, in a proclamation of August 9, 1941,1 invoked
the doctrine of changed conditions, when he declared the International
Load Line Convention of 1930,76 to which the United States was a
circumstances. But when these change, the reason underlying the whole position also
changes; accordingly every contracting party retains the right to consult its own
interests). Lauterpacht, Spinoza and International Law, 7 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 89, 94
(1927); HLL, THE DocTmum oF REBUS Sic STANrrBus ni" INTENATIoNAL LAW (1934);
Garner, The Doctrine of Rebus Sic Stantibus and the Termination of Treaties, 21 Am.
J. INT'L L. 509 (1927); Fischer Williams, The Permanence of Treaties, 22 Am. J.
INT'L. L. 89 (1928); HARv. REsSEARCH, LAW OF TREAT ES 1096 et seq. (1935); Briggs,
Rebus Sic Stantibus Before the Security Council, 43 Am. J. IwT'L L. 762 et seq. (1949);
UNITED NATIONS ECONomIC AND SOCL5 CouNicm, COc aMsSIoN ON Hum=7 RIGHTS: STUDY
OF =rE LEGAL VALIDITY OF =E UNDERTA=INGS CONCERNING M iORITIES, E/CN.4/367,
pp. 36 et seq. (1950).
73 For the view that the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus has found its way to public
international law from civil contracts by way of analogy see PrAr, DiE CLAUSaL REBUS Sic
STANTIuS IN DER DoETRm tND DER STERmCnIScN GESETZGEBUNG (1898); BINDEwALD,
RIcHisGEscmcHmic Cnn DARSTELLUNG DER CLAuSEL REBUS SIC STANTIBUS UND IMM
STEL.NG 3m B]RGEB icHEN GESETZBUCH (1901); SCHLESnzGER, ComARATIE LAW CASES
AND MATERuAS 325n (1950).
74 The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581 (1889); Hooper v. United States, 22 Ct.
Cl. 408 (1887).
75 DEP 'T STATE BULL. 114 (1941), 6 FED. REG. 3999 (1941). The Proclamation was
revoked by the President on December 21, 1945, effective January 1, 1946, 59 STAT. 890
(1945); 10 FED. REG. 15365 (1945).
76 47 STAT. 2228 (1933). This Convention was signed in London, July 5, 1930, and
proclaimed by the President on January 5, 1933. The Convention was concluded with
the aim of promoting "safety of life and property at sea by establishing in common
agreement uniform principles and rules with regard to the limits to which ships on
international voyages may be loaded" (Preamble), and its Articles provide in considerable
detail for the limits to which vessels of various categories may be loaded when engaged
in international voyages. The Convention was signed and ratified by 36 States, of which
ten were engaged in war at the date of the President's Proclamation, and sixteen of
them were under military occupation. From these facts a "change of conditions" was
inferred by the Acting Attorney General. The American Republics, however, which
were parties to the Convention, had previously assented to the suspension by the
United States. 5 DE'Pr STATE BULL. 114 (1941).
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party, "suspended or inoperative . . . for the duration of the present
emergency." The president's decision was based upon the advice of
the Acting Attorney General that the International Load Line Conven-
tion was a peacetime agreement and therefore had ceased to be binding
upon the United States, because the essential conditions upon which
it was founded had changed after the outbreak of World War II."
The action of the President was vigorously criticized by some writ-
ers78 while others 9 tried to find in it a case which could be factually
referred to as an "effect of war on treaties". It seems clear, however,
that the facts of the case did not justify the invocation of either doctrine.
War might lead to changes that would justify invoking the theory of
changed conditions. These changes, however, must meet the same re-
quirements as any other changes in conditions.
First, the change in conditions must be fundamental, that is to
say, those conditions on which the very existence of the treaty was based
must have disappeared.8" The maxim, the reason of the law ceasing,
the law itself ceases (cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex) would be
applicable by way of analogy: the reason of the treaty ceasing, the
treaty itself ceases.
Second, the doctrine applies only to treaties of indefinite or perpetual
duration that contain no express provision concerning the procedure
by which they may be amended or abrogated.81
Third, the party wishing to invoke the doctrine to terminate the
obligations of the treaty cannot denounce the treaty unilaterally,82 but
77 40 Ops. Amry GEN. No. 24 (1941).
78 See Briggs, The Attorney General Invokes Rebus Sic Stantibus, 36 Ami. J. INT'L L.
89, 90 (1942):
This surprising, and, indeed, reckless and -unnecessary, espousal by the United States
of a much questioned doctrine by which Germany, Italy, Japan, and Soviet Russia
might equally well justify the suspension, termination, or even violation, of in-
convenient treaties ...
79 Lissitzyn, supra note 71, at 206.
80 Williams, supra note 72, at 91:
That doctrine is not that one State has a -unilateral right to declare itself not bound
by a subsisting contract; it is that the treaty itself has gone, since an essential con-
dition in which it was concluded has disappeared; and this results, either because
on the treaty's true construction this is what the parties themselves have intended,
or because the very nature of the case requires that the change of an essential con-
dition should have this effect. The treaty in this event is, in fact, not voidable, but
dead or "obsolete", if that word be preferred.
See also HARv. RE SEARC H, LAW Or TREATES 1096 (1935).
81 See Hooper v. United States, 22 Ct. Cl. 408, 416 (1887).
82 In 1870, Russia, alleging changed conditions, took advantage of the Franco-Prussian
War of 1870 to denounce unilaterally the stipulations of the Treaty of Paris of 1856 re-
stricting its rights in the Black Sea (3 HERTSLET, THE MAP or EuRoPE BY TREATIs 1892
(1875)). Great Britain protested. A conference was called in London in 1871 between
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must seek the consent" of the other party or parties to its release.
Fourth, without this consent, the party must submit his case to a
competent international authority in order to secure recognition of
the validity of his claim.8 4
Subject to these very definite legal restrictions, it is submitted,
the doctrine of changed conditions applies to the social changes brought
about by war if a party to a treaty wishes to invoke it in order to
free himself from a treaty obligation which has become obsolete. 5
According to the absolute abrogation doctrine, the effect of war
on treaties and the doctrine of changed conditions are logically distinct.
representatives of the signatories of the Treaty of Paris and the following DECLARATION
RELATIVE TO THE INvIoLABILITY OF TREATIES was agreed upon on January 17, 1871: "It
is an essential principle of the Law of Nations that no Power can liberate itself front
the engagements of a Treaty, nor modify the stipulations thereof, unless with the consent
of the Contracting Powers by means of an amicable arrangement.' (Italics added). 61
BRITIsir AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 1198 (1870-1871). When Germany unilaterally re-
pudiated the Treaty of Versailles first, on March 10, 1935, repudiating her obligations
under Part V (disarmament clauses), and then on March 7, 1936, her obligations under
Article 43 (demilitarisation of the Rhineland), the Council of the League of Nations
condemned the German unilateral repudiation and reiterated the principles expressed in
the above cited London Declaration of 1871. LEAGUE or NATIoGNs, OrFCImL JOURNAL
551 (1935), id. 312 (1936).
83 Article 10 of the Convention on Relations Between the Three Powers and the
Federal Republic of Germany, signed at Bonn on May 26, 1952, provides that "the Three
Powers and the Federal Republic . . . will, by mutual agreement, modify the present
Convention . . . to the extent made necessary or advisable by the fundamental change
in the situation". 82d Cong. 2d Sess., Senate Executives Q and R, 13 (1952).
Almost model treaties from the point of view of clarity of the intent of the parties
in regard to the procedure to be followed in case of changed circumstances is the Economic
Cooperation Agreements between the United States and the countries participating in
the European Recovery Program, signed in 1948, See SUPPLEMENT To TnE FIRST REPORT
TO CoNGRESSs OF T ECONOmIC COOPERATION ADMINISTRATION (1948), containing the
following provision:
If, during the life of this Agreement, either Government should consider there has
been a fundamental change in the basic assumptions underlying this Agreement, it
shall so notify the other Government in writing and the two Governments will there-
upon consult with a view to agreeing upon the amendment, modification or termina-
tion of this Agreement. If, after three months from such notification, the two
Governments have not agreed upon the action to be taken in the circumstances, either
Government may give notice in writing to the other of intention to terminate this
Agreement. Then . . . this Agreement shall terminate six months after the date of
such notice of intention to terminate ...
See, e.g., f1 2, Art. II of the Agreement with Austria, SUPPLEMENT, supra, p. 30.
84 H=iI, op. cit. supra note 72, at 78; HARv. REsEARCr, LAW OF TREATs 1096 (1935).
85 U.N. EcoNoMIC AND SOCIAL CoINcIL: STUDY OF THE LEGAL VALIDITY OF TEE UNDER-
TAXINGS CONCERNING MINoRITIEs, E/CN.4/367, pp. 9 and 71 (1950), comes to the
conclusion that between 1939 and 1947 circumstances as a whole changed to such an
extent that the whole system of Treaties concerning Minorities should be considered
as having ceased to exist, and invokes the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus, but not war,
as terminating minority treaties.
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The former cuts off treaty obligations automatically on the declaration
of war; under the latter theory, the treaty must meet the requirements
set out above. The absolute abrogation doctrine, however, is not sound
and acceptable*as it encourages anarchy and defiance of international
legal obligations even more than is required by modern warfare. The
courts will not automatically" invoke rebus sic stantibus where war
has lead to changes. The intent87 of the parties to invoke the doctrine,
as expressed by their political departments, is important. This limitation
is well established by the holdings of the courts."8
In Clark v. Allen, 9 the question of changed conditions in the status
of one party to a treaty was raised by the attorney for respondents,
who alleged that the treaty in issue had entirely ceased to exist. The
court held, however, that the provisions of a treaty, which have other-
wise survived the outbreak of war between the contracting parties may
not be held by the courts to have been abrogated merely because "one
of them has ceased to exist as an independent national or international
community", where the political departments of the government have
not so decided. Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court, said:
86 Swiss Bundesgericht in 1923: "Von einem ipso jure eintretenden Erlbschen der
vertraglichen Verbindlichkeit kann nicht die Rede sein. . . . Der Staat, welcher von
diesem Rechte Gebrauch machen will, muss seinem dahingehenden Willen in den Formen
des V61kerrechts dem Vertragsgegner . . . er~ffnen". 49 BuNDESGERIxcHrCnn EN rscnI-
DUNGE (hereinafter BGE) I, p. 149 (1923).
87 Hh , op. cit. supra note 72, at 75: "The doctrine has been clearly based juridically
upon the intention of the parties at the time of the conclusion of the treaty." In theory,
this may be true. But in addition there must be an intent to invoke the doctrine at the
time of denunciation. See notes 88-91 infra.
88 A leading Swiss case on the subject is Lepeschkin v. Gosweiler & Co., decided by
the Bundesgericht in 1923, 49 BGE I, 149 (1923). Here the question was whether the
Hague Convention on Civil Procedure of 1905 still remained in force as between France
and Soviet Russia, because of the fundamental changes consequent upon the emergence
of the Russian Communist State. The court held that neither France nor Soviet Russia
had denounced the Convention, and that until the political authorities had denounced
it the courts were bound to apply it. See also the Case of the Free Zones of Upper
Savoy and the District of Gex, decided by the Permanent Court of International Justice
in 1932, Ser. A/B, No. 46, p. 158; Ser. C, No. 19 (1), pp. 192-199; Hooper v. United
States, 22 Ct. Cl. 408 (1887); German Reichsgericht in June 26, 1925, 54 Jumsrsscn.
Wocan-scnnars 2476 (1925); Canton of Thurgau v. Canton of St. Gallen, the Swiss
Bundesgericht in 1928, ANNUAL DiGEsr, Case No. 289 (1927-1928).
89 331 U.S. 503 (1947). See also In re Reihs' Estate, 102 Cal. App. 2d 206, 227 P.2d
564 (1951). The appellant urged in the latter case that the unconditional surrender
of Germany May 8, 1945, and the military occupation which followed after that date,
and the establishment of a Military Government for Germany effected an abrogation
of all vested rights theretofore existing under German civil law, including the right of
inheritance. The court held however that the alien legatees were entitled to take -under
the will.
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. . . the question whether a state is in a position to perform its treaty
obligations is essentially a political question. .... We find no evidence
that the political departments have considered the collapse and surrender
of Germany as putting an end to such provisions of the treaty as survived
the outbreak of the war or the obligation of either party in respect to
them. The Allied Control Council has, indeed, assumed control of Ger-
many's foreign affairs and treaty obligations-a policy and course of con-
duct by the political departments wholly consistent with the maintenance
and enforcement, rather than the repudiation, of pre-existing treaties.9 0
(Italics added.)
An important Swiss case, the Occupation of Germany Case (Zfirich ),91
decided by the Court of Appeal of Ztirich, December 1, 1945, also deals
with the effect of the changed status of Germany, in connection with
the application of the Hague Convention on Civil Procedure of 1905.
The Court held that Germany, although occupied and without an in-
dependent government, had not ceased to exist as a State, and that
consequently the Treaty with her was. still in force.
The changes to which war might lead, such as the disappearance of
a party state, may, of course, justify reliance on the doctrine of changed
conditions. But in such a case the result of war, not the outbreak of
war, is the decisive factor, and this can be logically described as a type
of changed conditions and not as a separate doctrine.
International as well as Domestic Society ought to provide sufficient
flexibility in its legal order to accommodate the requirements of social
changes. Consequently, the doctrine of changed conditions is an
essential component92 in the international legal order, subject how-
ever to the important limitations and requirements indicated above.
III. MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PRACTICE OF STATES
Views of Political Departments
Generally speaking, the question of conclusion as well as termination
or revision of treaties is primarily political and is the responsibility
of the political department of a government, just as are the questions
whether a State is justified in disregarding treaty obligations in time
of war, or what remedy shall be invoked against a foreign State when
90 331 U.S. at 514.
91 42 SCHwaIZm'ScHE JURISTENZETUrNG 89 (1946); ANNuAL DIGEST, Case No. 86
(1946) ; SCHLESINGER, op. cit. supra note 73, at 452 (1950); see also the case "Helvetia"
v. Kuch and Frauenberger-Kuch, decided by the Swiss Bundesgericht, April 15, 1946,
AsNuAL DIGEST, Case No. 85 (1946). The Court held that German political authority
had not been extinguished, and that Swiss courts must apply a treaty as long as the
Federal Council or the Federal Assembly have not denounced it, or have not declared
in any other way that the treaty is no longer valid.
92 JEssup, A MODERN LAW OF NAoNs 150 (1948).
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it has disregarded its treaty obligations. These are actions of the political
departments in a political capacity. This view seems quite natural
since the political departments represent the State in international inter-
course and, therefore, are the proper organs to express the intention of
a State regarding the validity of a treaty in time of war.
In the United States, the decision of the political department of the
government regarding the continued existence of treaties or treaty
provisions is generally considered binding on the courts, 3 for the courts
play a more humble part when deciding the validity of a treaty in time
of war.94 This view is supported also in England,9 Switzerland,96
France,97 and Germany." In the United States, however, matters of
construction are essentially a function of the courts,99 though it has
been suggested0 0 in one case that the court address a request to the
State Department for a definition of executive policy. "The recent
tendency in Great Britain has been to make just such an application
to the political department, and "Such a certificate is normally con-
93 Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447 (1913); Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270 (1902);
The Head Money Cases (Edye v. Robertson), 112 U.S. 580 (1884); Techt v. Hughes,
229 N.Y. 222, 128 N.E. 185 (1920).
94 Techt v. Hughes, note 93 supra.
95 Rex v. Bottrill, [19471 1 K.B. 41; McNAia, THF LAW OF TREATIES at 530 et seq.
(1938).
96 Lepeschkin v. Gosweiler & Co., Swiss Bundesgericht, 1923, 71 JOURNAL DES TRIBUNAUX
ET REvuE JuDICIAIRE 582 (1923), 49 BGE I, 149 (1923); Occupation of Germany
Case (Zirich), Court of Appeal of Zflrich, December 1, 1945, ANNUAL DIGEST, Case No.
86 (1946); "Helvetia" v. Kuch and Frauenberger-Kuch, Swiss Bundesgericht, April 15,
1946, ANNUAL DIGEST Case No. 85 (1946).
97I The French Government alone is in a position to declare which treaties are to
be abrogated, and this by an express indication of which particular treaty or which
particular part in a given treaty is to stand or fall. Any attempt to lay upon the
judge the responsibility for deciding which treaties are abrogated and which remain
in force is futile according to French tradition. See CHAILEY, NATURE JURIDIQUE DES
TRAITES INTERNATIONAUX SUIVANT LE DROIT CONTEMORAINE 113 (1932); LAPRADELLE-
NiHOYET, REPERTOIRE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, SUPPLEMrENT, No. 259 et seq. (1934);
PAYOT, LES INSiRUCTIONS DU GOUVERNEMENT LORS DE L'INTERPR9TATION JuDIiCIAIRE DI
DROIT INTERNATIONAL (1950).
98 "Only the Government decides as to the continued validity of treaties. This is
binding on the courts." Translated from a letter to the author by a German Govern-
ment official.
99 United States v. Domestic Fuel Corp., 71 F.2d 424 (Ct. Cust. & Pat. App. 1934);
The Frances Louise, 1 F.2d 1004 (D.C. Cir. 1924), appeal dismtissed, sub nom. United
States v. Backman, 270 U.S. 666 (1926); The Sophie Rickmers, 45 F.2d 413 (S.D.N.Y.
1930); Frasca v. City Coal Co., 97 Conn. 212, 116 Ati. 189 (1922); San Lorenzo Title
&'Improv. Co. v. Caples, 48 S.W.2d 329 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
300 Clark, J., dissenting opinion, Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres Societe Anonyme,
163 F.2d 246, 253 (2d Cir. 1947).
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clusive on matters both of fact and law.... ." The United States has
not gone this far; in matters of construction, that is of law, the views
of the political department, although they are entitled to great weight,
are not conclusive. 2 And in the absence of a denunciation of a treaty
by the political department, the courts will normally treat it as still
in effect. 3
1) The United States: The Department of State has not undertaken
to establish a general rule concerning the operation of bilateral treaties
in time of war. Practice of the Department has varied. At an earlier
time,10 4 and during the first World War,0 5 it expressed the opinion
that bilateral treaties did not remain in force. During the second World
War the State Department took a more liberal view? 6 With respect
to multilateral treaties the following letter of January 29, 1948, from
the State Department Legal Adviser, Ernest A. Gross, to the author
is reproduced in part:
With respect to multilateral treaties of the type referred to in your letter,
however, this Government considers that, in general, non-political multi-
lateral treaties to which the United States was a party when the United
States became a belligerent in the war, and which this Government has
not since denounced in accordance with the terms thereof, are still in
force in respect of the United States and that the existence of a state of
war between some of the parties to such treaties did not ipso facto abro-
gate them, although it is realized that, as a practical matter, certain of
the provisions might have been inoperative. The view of this Govern-
ment is that the effect of the war on such treaties was only to terminate
or suspend their execution as between opposing belligerents, and that, in
101 Rex v. Bottrill, [1947) 1 K.B. 41, 55.
102 The Yulu, 71 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1934), cerl. denied, 293 U.S. 589 (1934); United
States v. Reid, 73 F.2d 153 (Cir. 1934), eert. denied, 299 U.S. 544 (1936); The Sophie
Rickmers, 45 F.2d 413 (S.D.N.Y. 1930). For earlier views and practice of State Depart-
ment see 5 MooRE, DIGEST or INTERNATIONAL LAW 383 et seq. (1906); 6 HAcxWoRTr,
DIGEST OF INTERxATioNAL LAW 327 (1943); as to the practice of political departments
of other states see Riihland, Zur Theorie und Praxis des Rinfltsses des Kriegsbegins auf
Staatsvertrdge, 32 NmYERS ZETSCnUsFT 74 (1924); JACOmET, LA GuEnR rET LES
TRArrfS s.a. [1909).
103 Techt v. Hughes, 229 N.Y. 222, 128 N.E. 185 (1920).
1045 MOORE, op. cit. supra note 102, at 375 et seq. (1906) ; WIEAToN, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 240 et seq. (8th ed. Dana, 1864).
105 Secretary of State Lansing in regard to the treaty provisions dealing with the
inheritance of property in 1918, said: ". . . in view of the present state of war between
the United States and Austria-Hungary and Germany, the Department does not regard
these provisions as now in operation". 6 HACKWORTH, op. cit. supra note 102 at 327 (1943).
10O Letter to the Attorney General from Acting Secretary of State, Joseph C. Grew,
dated May 21, 1945, commenting on the Government's position in the Briefs for a writ
of certiorari, pp. 24-31, Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947): "The Department [of
State] perceives no objection to the position . . . that Article IV of the Treaty . . .
remains in effect despite the outbreak of war." See also note 152 infra.
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the absence of special reasons for a contrary view, they remained in force
between co-belligerents, between belligerents and neutral parties, and be-
tween neutral parties.
It is considered by this Government that, with the coming into force on
September 15, 1947 of the treaty of peace with Italy, the non-political
multilateral treaties which were in force between the United States and
Italy at the time a state of war commenced between the two countries,
and which neither government has since denounced in accordance with
the terms thereof, are now in force and again in operation as between the
United States and Italy. A similar position has been adopted by the
United States Government regarding Bulgaria, Hungary, and Ru-
mania ...
The State Department view with respect to the specific question of
Austrian, as well as German, pre-war treaties is set forth in a letter
to the writer by the Assistant for Treaty Affairs, Charles I. Bevans,
Office of the Legal Adviser, dated June 8, 1953, which is in part as
follows:
With regard to the status of prewar treaties between the United States
and Austria, the Department of State has considered those treaties to
be still in force between the two countries. This is predicated on the
position the Department has taken that, although as a practical matter the
United States was obliged to take certain administrative measures based
upon the situation created by the Ansckluss, the United States Government
consistently avoided any step which might be considered to constitute dejure recognition of the annexation of Austria by Germany. Accordingly,
this Government regards Austria as a country liberated from forcible
domination by Nazi Germany, and not as an ex-enemy State or a State
at war with the United States during the Second World War.
With respect to Germany the Department has refrained from expressing
an opinion in general as to the effect of World War II on the treaties in
force between the United States and Germany at the time of the out-
break of a state of war between the two countries. The Department,
however, has taken a position regarding the effect of the war on the pro-
visions of certain of the prewar treaties. It has officially stated that in
the absence of a specific decision by an appropriate court holding that the
provisions regarding the right of entry embodied in Article I of the treaty
of friendship, commerce and consular rights between the United States
and Germany, signed at Washington December 8, 1923, are presently
binding upon the parties to the treaty, or until a new treaty which includes
right of entry provisions enters into force between the United States and
the Federal Republic of Germany, the Department of State is not pre-
pared to authorize the issuance of "treaty merchant" visas to German
nationals in accordance with Section 3 (6) of the Immigration Act of
1924, as amended (8 U.S.C. 203).
On the other hand, the Department, even prior to the decision of the
Supreme Court in the case of Clark v. Allen, expressed the view that
there would seem to be no reason to regard Article IV of the treaty of
1923 with Germany as not continuing to be operative despite the outbreak
[Vol. 38
MODERN WAR AND TREATIES
of war. The Department also considers that, whereas during the war the
consular provisions of the 1923 treaty were inoperative as a practical
matter so long as German consular officers were not functioning in the
United States and American consular officers were not functioning in
Germany, it is in accord with generally recognized principles to consider
that upon the restoration of consular relations between the United States
and the Federal Republic of Germany the consular provisions again be-
came operative.
Prior to the action indicated below which has been taken with respect to
the convention for the unification of certain rules relating to international
transportation by air, signed at Warsaw October 12, 1929, the Department
on several occasions stated that the Warsaw convention was applicable
to German territory as the result of its ratification by Germany, that it
was not abrogated by the war, although suspended in its practical opera-
tion during the time of actual hostilities, and that it has been in effect as
regards Germany since the termination of hostilities.
Apart from passing upon the queftion of the effect of the war on the
treaties in force between the United States and Germany at the time
of the outbreak of the war, the Department at present is in the process of
making a final determination as to which of the prewar treaties and agree-
ments the United States Government desires be given effect between the
United States and the Federal Republic of Germany in accordance with
Directive No. 6 of the Allied High Commission entitled "Treaties Con-
cluded by the Former German Reich," dated at Bonn March 19, 1951....
As in the case of notifications given to Bulgaria, Hungary, Italy, Japan,
and Rumania, in accordance with the provisions of the respective peace
treaties, regarding prewar treaties with each of those countries which this
Government wished to continue in force or revive, other agencies and
departments of the Government are being consulted before notification is
made concerning any of the prewar treaties between this Government
and the former German Reich which it is desired to give effect between
the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany.
Up to the present time, this Government has indicated, in accordance
with the procedures set forth in Directive No. 6, its desire to have four
prewar treaties placed in effect between the United States and the Federal
Republic of Germany, namely, the convention respecting the limitation
of the employment of force for the recovery of contract debts, signed
at The Hague October 18, 1907; the convention establishing uniform
rules with respect to assistance and salvage at sea, signed at Brussels
September 23, 1910; the convention for the unification of certain rules
relating to bills of lading, signed at Brussels August 25, 1924; and the
convention for the unification of certain rules relating to international
transportation by air, signed at Warsaw October 12, 1929. In each of the
notices given in connection with those conventions, this Government has
included a proviso that the notice "is without prejudice to the previous
status of any portion of the convention which may have remained operative
or may have again become operative at any time since the outbreak of
hostilities between the United States and Germany."
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The views expressed in these letters represent the prevailing modern
legal practice and opinion. The parts referring to the treaties with
Germany seem to be essentially in accord with the views of the German
Government in Bonn, which will be dealt with subsequently.
2) Great Britain: According to the opinion of the British Govern-
ment before the second World War, there is no inherent juristic im-
possibility either in the formation of treaty obligations between two
opposing belligerents during war, or in the continuance during war of
obligations formed before the war."0 The British position on the
issues raised by the second World War is expressed in a letter from
the British Foreign Office to the author,' which is reproduced here in
part:
I am replying . . . to your letter . . . in which you enquired about the
legal status of Multilateral Treaties of a technical or non-political nature,
and whether these treaties are regarded by His Majesty's Government in
the United Kingdom as having been terminated by war, or merely sus-
pended.
You will observe that, in the Peace Treaties with Italy, Finland, Rou-
mania, Bulgaria and Hungary, no mention is made of such treaties, the
view being taken at the Peace Conference that no provision regarding
them was necessary, inasmuch as, according to International Law, such
treaties were in principle simply suspended as between the belligerents
for the duration of the war, and revived automatically with the peace.
It is not the view of His Majesty's Government that multilateral conven-
tions ipso facto should lapse with the outbreak of war, and this is par-
ticularly true in the case of conventions to which neutral Powers are par-
ties. Obvious examples of such conventions are the International Air
Navigation Convention of 1919 and various Postal and Telegraphic Con-
ventions. Indeed, the true legal doctrine would appear to be that it is
only the suspension of normal peaceful relations between belligerents
which renders impossible the fulfilment of multilateral conventions in so
far as concerns them, and operates as a temporary suspension as between
the belligerents of such conventions. In some cases, however, such as the
Red Cross Convention, the multilateral convention is especially designed
to deal with the relations of Powers at war, and clearly such a convention
would continue in force and not be suspended.
As regards multilateral conventions to which only the belligerents are
parties, if these are of a non-political and technical nature, the view upon
which His Majesty's Government would probably act is that they would
be suspended during the war, but would thereafter revive automatically
unless specifically terminated. This case, however, has not yet arisen
in practice.
What the attitude of the British Government has been in regard to
the bilateral treaties between belligerents during the second World War
107 McNAiR, THE LAw oF TREATIES 530 (1938).
108 Letter from J. Mervyn Jones, British Foreign Office, dated January 7, 1948.
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is not clear from this letter. According to earlier British practice they
need not be abrogated or even suspended, as has been already observed
in the Russo-Dutch Loan case.1"9 The British view emphasizes the im-
portance of the intention and admits no automatic abrogation of treaties
by war.
3) France: The French official position, on the other hand, con-
trary to the British and American, seems to favor the absolute abroga-
tion doctrine. 'Some evidence of this stand may be found in the French
Government's declaration in regard to Japan: "Conventions with Japan
were abrogated by the outbreak of war."' 10 I regret not being able
to present the official view of the French Government on the general
question of the validity of treaties during the Second World War. I
should like, however, to set forth the opinion of M. Chargueraud-Hart-
man, the former Director of Technical Agreements of the French
Foreign Ministry, as expressed in a letter, dated December 29, 1947
to me:
The outbreak of war terminates all intercourse between the belligerents
and therefore also all bilateral treaties with some exceptions, according
to the French view .... The differentiation between political conventions
and those regulating private rights is not justified, because in every treaty
concluded between sovereign states there is always a political aspect
present, despite the fact that the provision of such a treaty may contem-
plate only private rights. The party states are providing privileges for
their nationals, which certainly is an act of political importance and which
certainly is not intended to continue in time of war ...
The multilateral conventions however ... remain in force during a war
between the allied powers, as well as between the neutrals themselves and
between neutrals and belligerents. On the other hand, hostilities suspend
these conventions as between belligerents. Their suspension has, however, a
temporary effect, and the conventions will be in operation again between
the belligerents after the establishment of peace, if the peace treaties do
not provide otherwise." 1
The view expressed above concerning multilateral conventions is
the prevailing one.
4) Italy. Italy has always favored the maintenance of treaties con-
cerning private rights, despite the occurrence of war.- 2  I should
like to quote a letter from the Italian Ministry of Justice to the Max-
Planck Institute for Foreign and Private International Law, dated No-
vember 28, 1950:"13
109 See p. 327 supra.
110 JouF.NAL OmIIL, October 14, 1945.
111 Translated from the French by the writer.
112 1 ANMOTTI, COUES DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 347 et seq. (1919).
"= Cited in 7 JuxRsTEzr.n'zuNc 682 (1952), translated by the present writer.
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* . . it is in our jurisprudence a recognized principle that a state of war
does not cause the extinction of treaties, except in cases of incompati-
bility, and therefore it is the view of this Department that the Italian-
German Convention of 1937 [concerning the Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, concluded March
9, 1936] 114 after the falling away of hindrances caused by hostilities
could be regarded as in force.
The same Italian attitude is found in Article 280 of the War Law
of July 8, 1938,1" which grants persons of enemy nationality in Italy,
who are of full legal capacity, the right to bring and defend actions in
Italian courts throughout the war. This practice is similar to the
American or English position." 6
There is no doubt that all treaties concerning private rights con-
cluded between Germany and Italy before the outbreak of war between
those two countries in 1943 were considered in force and applied ac-
cordingly by Italy after 1943.17 Also in her relations with France,
Italy upheld the validity of and continued to apply the Franco-Italian
Commercial Agreement of April 14, 1938.118
5) Finland: Since her independence in 1918, Finland has been in-
volved in two wais with the Soviet Union:" 9 the first beginning on
November 30, 1939, and the second in June, 1941. The account of
the Finnish stand concerning the effect of these two wars on the validity
of treaties with the Soviet Union is based on a Finnish Foreign Office
promemoria.' °
a. Bilateral Treaties: All political treaties between Finland and the
Soviet Union were regarded as abrogated at the outbreak of the war;
as, for example, Peace Treaty of Tartu of 1920; Treaty Regarding the
14 RICSGESETZBLATT (hereinafter RGBI. II, 145 (1937)); GAZETTA UrrsCIAs.a No.
44, Feb. 22, 1937.
115 GAZETTA U 'cALE No. 211, Sept. 9, 1938.
116 Trading with the Enemy Act § 7(b), 40 STAT. 416 (1919), 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 7(b)
(1951); Trading with the Enemy Act, 1939, 2 & 3 GEo. 6, c. 189; Petition of Bernheimer
et al., 130 F.2d 396 (3d Cir. 1942); see also Franck C. Sterck and Carl J. Schuck, The
Right of Resident Alien Enemies to, Sue, 30 GF-o. L.J. 421 (1941-42); George Gordon
Battle, Enemy Litigants in Our Courts, 28 VA. L. Rav. 429 (1941-42).
117 See Neumeyer, Ober die Fortgeltung deutsch-italienischer Staatsvertrdige privatrecht-
lichen Inhalts, 7 JuRisTENzErTuNG 682, 683 (1952); Altenberg, Sicherheitsleistungen von
italienischen Kldgern im Zivilprozess, 4 NEuE JuaisTiscxm WocHmscHiR-= 831 (1951).
118 See La Pradelle, The Effect of War on Private Treaties, 2 INT'L L.Q. 556, 575 (1948).
119 Great Britain declared war on Finland for political reasons on December 6, 1941,
but there was never any actual warfare between these two States. Multilateral treaties
between Great Britain and Finland were applied by Finland as much as possible in
the prevailing war conditions.
120 Unpublished, written in the Finnish language, prepared by the Legal Adviser to
the Finnish Foreign Office, and kindly- placed at the disposal of the writer.
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Guaranty of Boundary Peace of June 1, 1922; Finnish-Soviet Non-
aggression Pact of 1932, together with an Additional Treaty Providing
for Arbitration.
The same position, regarding non-political treaties, was taken on the
basis of the doctrine of changed conditions. The term rebus sic stantibus
is not used, but the tenor of the memorandum seems to amount to sub-
stantially the same thing. Accordingly the following treaties were held
abrogated: Convention concerning the Shipment of Goods of Sept. 6,
1940; Postal and telecommunication conventions; Treaty on the Return
of Public Records and Documents from the Soviet Russia of June 18,
1924; treaties regulating the activity of boundary guards at the Carel-
ian Isthmus, those regulating fishing, catching of seals, floating of tim-
ber, traffic of vessels, on the Neva River, maintaining order outside
territorial waters, and guarding against smuggling.
b. Multilateral Treaties: The Treaty Concerning the Demilitarization
and Neutralization of Aaland Islands of 1921 was regarded as sus-
pended on the grounds of Finland's safety, but was not held abrogated.
Other multilateral treaties were also regarded as in force even if it was
not possible to apply all of them during the war. However, multilateral
treaties between Finland and the Baltic States were considered by Fin-
land to be abrogated because of the occupation and annexation of these
states by the Soviet Union. The abrogation in this case was due to the
changed conditions and not to the war. Similarly, the Oslo Convention
of May 28, 1937 between Finland, the other Scandinavian States, Hol-
land and Belgium, was considered abrogated because of the occupation
of most of the treaty states by Germany. According to the Finnish
view, it must be decided individually for each multilateral treaty whether
or not it is to remain in force in view of the changed conditions brought
about by the war.
6) Germany: Two preliminary observations regarding Germany are
necessary. First, Germany has not lost her international personality" 1
1M For the legal status of Germany after the World War II see Rex v. Bottrill, ex
parte K-uechenmeister, [1947] 1 K.B. 41; Occupation of Germany Case (Ziurich), Swiss
Court of Appeal of Zilrich, Dec. 1, 1945, 42 SCKwEIZERiSCE JUIMSTENZEITUNG 89 (1946);
"Helvetia" v. Kuch and Frauenberger-Kuch, Swiss Bundesgericht, April 15, 1946, AimrUAL
DIOESr, Case No. 85 (1946); see also Jennings, Governntent in Commission, 23 B.iT. Y.B.
IwTI, L. 112 (1946); GPEwE, Em BESATZUNGSSTATUT PtJR DEuTscnTAarD. Dim RECHTs-
FoaaiN DER BESE'ZUNG (1948); KAu ANN, DEUTsCHLA 'DS RECHTSLAGE UNTER DER
BESETZUNG (1948); Laun, Der gegenwirtige Rechtszustand Deutsdztands, JAxmBuci
iR IxTE1mATIoNALas uND Or=ENTncHEs RECUT 9 et seq. (1948); LEwALD, GRUND-
LAGEN DER NETEN RECHSORDNUNG DEUTsciMANDS (1948); Sauser-Hall, L'occupation
de l'AUemagne par les Puissances Allies, 3 SCHWEZERISCHES JAHRBUCH Fia INTERNA-
TIONALES RET 9-63 (1946). As for the status of Austria see, e.g., VERosTA, DiE INTE-
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and is therefore still a party to treaties concluded by the former German
-Reich Government. Second, only the German Federal Republic Govern-
ment at Bonn" = is entitled to speak in the name of the German State in
treaty questions and entitled to express the intent of the German State,
either in concluding new or applying old prewar agreements of the
German Reich Government. According to the provisions of Article 1
of the Convention on Relations Between the Three Powers and the
Federal Republic of Germany, signed at Bonn on May 26, 1952,'
the Allied occupation of West Germany will be ended and the Federal
Republic shall have "full authority over its internal and external affairs",
with the exception of rights which the Three Powers retain for them-
selves relating to the stationing of their armed forces in Germany.
These reservations, it is understood, do not however limit in any way the
"full authority" of the Bonn Government over its treaty rights.
The present legal status in matters of the reapplication of German
pre-war treaties is based on the Directive No. 6 of the Allied High
Commission of March 19, 1951 concerning Treaties Concluded by the
Former German Reich."24 Based on this Directive, the Bonn Govern-
NATIONALE STELLUNG OSTERREICHS 1938 BIS 1947 (1947). The State Department view is
that Austria is a liberated country and not an ex-enemy state. Therefore the pre-war
treaties with Austria are still in force. See the letter to the writer by Charles I. Bevans,
Assistant for Treaty Affairs, Office of the Legal Adviser, dated June 8, 1953, and cited
supra p. 344.
122 Formed on September 21, 1949.
123 82d Cong., 2d Sess., Senate Executives Q & R, (1952); ratified by Bonn Bunde-
stag (the German lower house), by 224 votes to 165, on March 19, 1953, N.Y. Times,
March 20, 1953, p. 1, col. 4. This Convention had been ratified by Great Britain and
the United States earlier (by the Senate on July 1, 1952, 27 DEP'T STATE BULL. 67 (1952)).
The Convention has not yet entered into force. The state of war with Germany was
terminated on October 19, 1951, Pub. L. No. 181, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (Oct. 19, 1951).
124 Om"iCAL GAZETTE or 'raE AuaaD HIGH CommissioN FOR GERMANY No. 52, p. 846
(April 2, 1951). Directive No. 6 contains the following provisions:
1. Any communications received by the Allied High Commission from an interested
Power, pursuant to the invitation extended by the three Allied Governments, propos-
ing that a treaty or treaties of the former German Reich be given effect as between
the Federal Republic and such interested Power, shall be transmitted by the Allied
High Commission to the Federal Republic. The Federal Government may then
communicate directly with such interested Power with reference to the treaty or
treaties in question.
2. If the Federal Government desires that a treaty or treaties of the former German
Reich be given effect as between the Federal Republic and the other party or parties
thereto, it shall transmit a notice of this desire to the Allied High Commission. On
the basis of this notice, the Allied High Commission will authorize the Federal
Government to communicate directly with the interested Power with reference to
the treaty or treaties in question.
3. When the Federal Government officially notifies the Allied High Commission
that it and the other interested Power desires to give effect to all or part of a treaty
of the former Reich, and, if necessary, are agreed on the effective date of that
treaty, the Allied High Commission, unless it disapproves, shall, in a communication
to the Federal Government, declare that the treaty is applicable to the Federal Re-
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ment during 1951 and 1952 concluded several agreements with former
enemy States on the reapplication of altogether 35 bilateral and 32 multi-
lateral pre-war conventions.
There are, however, only few official statements by the Bonn Govern-
ment itself expressing its views in regard to the validity of German
pre-war treaties. It seems that the Bonn Government has adopted the
so-called intermediate view. 2-5 According to this position, the outbreak of
war has no generally applicable effect on treaties, but such effect varies
with different types of treaties. Thus the intrinsic character (Inialt) of a
treaty, and the intent of the parties at the time of its conclusion are the
decisive factors. This view is the prevailing modern one of writers 20
and American legal opinion,127 and it is gratifying that it has been
adopted and applied by the present German Government in its entirety.
Speaking in more concrete terms all pre-existing treaties are divided
into different groups and the attitude of the German Government as
to their validity under present conditions seems to be as follows:
public and is binding upon it. This communication shall be deemed to authorize
the Federal Government to publish the treaty concerned or make such other an-
nouncement as may be appropriate in the Official Gazette of the Federal Republic.
4. If reciprocity is the basis of a multilateral convention it will be binding only
as between the Federal Republic and such of the other signatories as agree.
5. If there is any objection on the part of the Federal Republic to a request
by an interested Power to put a treaty into operation, the Allied High Commission
will not decide what action, if any, will be taken -until after the expiry of six
months from the receipt of the initial request of the interested Power.
125 Private information received by the author from Dr. Ellinor von Puttkamer, Bonn,
Department for Foreign Affairs. According to this information, the question of the
validity of the German pre-war treaties has been considered in Germany as an im-
portant one. At the end of March, 1953, the "German Society for International Law"
held a Conference at Bonn for the sole purpose of discussing this subject. The Pro-
ceedings of that Conference have not yet been published, but have been available to
the author.
126 TOBr, THE TERumATION OF MuLTIPARTiE TREATIES (1933); RANK, EnWnI 'tNG
DES KIEGEs AU' DIE N cErTPoLITscEN STAATsVERTRAEGE (1949); Lenoir, The Effect of
War on Bilateral Ti'eaties, with Special Reference to Reciprocal Inheritance Treaty Pro-
visions, 34 GEo. L.J. 129-177 (1946); Orfield, The Effect of War on Treaties, 11 NEB.
L. BULL. 276, 279 (1933); Scelle, De l'influence de l'tat de guerre sur le Droit con-
ventionnel, 77 JousrNAL no DROIT INTERNATiONAL 26 et seq. (1950); La Pradelle, The
Effect of War on Private Law Treaties, 2 INT'L L.Q. 556 et seq. (1948).
127 Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947); Karnuth v. United States, 279 U.S. 231
(1929); Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. New Haven, 8 Wheat. 464 (U.S.
1823); Blank v. Clark, 79 F. Supp. 373 (E.D. Pa. 1948); The Sophie Rickmers, 45 F.2d
413 (S.D.N.Y. 1930); Hempel v. Weedin, 23 F.2d 949 (W.D. Wash. 1928); In re Knut-
zen's Estate, 31 Cal. 2d 573, 191 P.2d 747 (1948); In re Meyer's Estate, 107 Cal. App. 2d
799, 238 P.2d 597 (1951); State ex rel. Miner v. Reardon, 120 Kan. 614, 245 Pac. 158
(1926); Meier v. Schmidt, 150 Neb. 383, 34 N.W.2d 400, rehearing denied, 150 Neb. 647,
35 N.W.2d 500 (1948); Goos v. Brocks, 117 Neb. 750, 223 N.W. 13 (1929); Techt v.
Hughes, 229 N.Y. 222, 128 N.E. 185 (1920), cert. denied, 254 U.S. 643 (1920).
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First, treaties concluded to govern the conduct of hostilities are
considered as in full force;' 28
Second, treaties concerning humanitarian rights and preservation of
animal life and plants are equally considered as not abrogated by
war; 1
29
Third, the same principles apply to treaties concerning transit, trans-
portation and communications;' 30
Fourth,, all treaties concerning individual rights, including private
international law treaties,131 treaties concerning industrial and literary
property rights," 2 judicial assistance,'3 insurance, 14 leases, pensions,
12 E.g., the Protocol of 1925 concerning the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous,
and Other Gases, RGB1. II 174 (1929); The Geneva Conventions of 1929 concerning the
Treatment of Sick and Wounded and of Prisoners of War, RGBI. II 207 (1934).
129 E.g., Paris Convention regarding Diphtheria Serum of 1930, RGBI. II 337
(1930); International Agreement for the Creation in Paris of an International Office for
dealing with Contagious Diseases of Animals of 1924 and 1935, RGB1. 1I 318 (1924);
Bilateral treaties, e.g., German-Italian Convention on Commerce in Medicines, February
13, 1939, RGBI. II 219 (1939); German-Belgian Convention concerning the Fight
against Hydrophobia in Boundary Areas, Sept. 9 and Oct. 23, 1910, RGBL 1397 (1920);
International Convention for Mutual Protection against Dengue Fever, Athens, July
25, 1934, RGBI. II 235 (1936), formally in effect as of May 1, 1952 between the
Federal Republic and Egypt, Denmark, France, Algeria, Tunis, Morocco (French zone),
Greece, Union of South Africa and Yugoslavia, BGB1. II 953 (1952).
130 E.g., Warsaw Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules regarding Air Trans-
port, October 12, 1929, RGB1. 11 1040 (1933), formally in effect with regard to Den-
mark, France, Greece, Great Britain and Northern Ireland, India, Yugoslavia, the
Netherlands (BGBI. II 176 (1951)), Ceylon, Pakistan, the United States of America
(BGBI. II 437 (1952)), and Canada (BGB1. II 972 (1952)); the Convention on
Motor Traffic, April 24, 1926, RGB1. II 1233 (1930), formally in effect again as of
May 1, 1952 between the Federal Republic of Germany and the following ex-enemy
States: Egypt, Belgium, Denmark, France, India, Yugoslavia, Luxembourg, the Nether-
lands and Norway (BGBl. II 978 (1952)).
131 E.g., The Hague Convention Concerning Guardianship of Minors, June 12, 1902,
RGB1. 240 (1904); The Hague Convention on Civil Procedure of July 17, 1905, RGB1. 409
(1909), formally in effect as of January 1, 1952 with Holland (BGBI. II 435 (1952)),
with Belgium, September 1, 1952 (BGB1. II 728 (1952)), with Italy, October 1, 1952
(BGB1. II 986 (1952)).
132 E.g., The Berne Convention for the Protection of Works of Art and Literature,
Sept. 9, 1886, revised in Rome, June 2, 1928, RGB1. II 890 (1933), formally in effect
through exchange of notes between the Bonn Government and the Allied High Commission
of February 6 and 7, 1950, BuNmEsANZEiGEa No. 144 (1950); Convention between the
United States and Germany concerning Reciprocal Protection of Copyrights, January
15, 1892, RGB1. 473 (1892), formally in effect as of February 7, 1950, through exchange
of notes of February 6 and June 20, 1950, BuxEsANZEiGE No. 144 (1950).
183 Bilateral treaties as, e.g., the German-Danish Convention regarding the authentication
of Documents, June 17, 1936, RGB1. II, 213 (1936); German-Greek Convention on
Reciprocal Judicial Assistance in Civil Matters, May 11, 1938, RGB1. II (1939), formally
in effect as of February 1, 1952, through an exchange of notes of November 24, 1951, and
January 28, 1952, ROBI. II 634 (1952).
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and labour, 85 are considered not to be abrogated by war. It has been
considered, however, necessary to conclude new treaties in the field of
insurance, leases, and pensions in order to adapt these treaties to the
change in conditions which has occurred meanwhile. Treaties con-
cerning nationality, however, although belonging to the group of
treaties protecting individual rights, have been considered to be abro-
gated by the war, because of the evident political character of these
treaties, and the conclusion of the new treaties is therefore necessary.8 6
To the fourth group of treaties also belong, according to the German
view, consular conventions. Although these conventions essentially con-
tain provisions for the protection of individual rights, they are regarded
as abrogated, because of their intrinsic political character; 137
The fifth category includes cultural cooperation treaties. Multilateral
treaties of this kind have been regarded as in force,' but bilateral as
abrogated.3 Distinctions between multilateral and bilateral treaties
134 E.g., German-Belgian Convention concerning the Insurance of Farms Stretching
over the Boundary Line, July 16, 1931, RGBI. II 1037 (1933).
135 The Federal Republic Government has declared, BGBI. II 607 (1952), formally
in effect as of June. 12, 1951, the following conventions: Unemployment Convention,
Nov. 28, 1919, RGBl. II 162 (1925); Childbirth Convention, Nov. 28, 1919, RGBI. II
497 (1927); Minimum Age (Sea) Convention, July 9, 1920, RGBI. II 383 (1929); Un-
employment Indemnity (Shipwreck) Convention, July 9, 1920, RGBI. II 759 (1929);
Placing of Seamen Convention, July 10, 1920, RGB1. II 166 (1925); Minimum Age
(Trimmers and Stokers) Convention, Nov. 11, 1921, RGB1. II 383 (1929); Medical
Examination of Young Persons (Sea) Convention, Nov. 11, 1921, RGBI. II 386 (1929);
Right of Association (Agriculture) Convention, Nov. 12, 1921, RGBI. II 171 (1925);
Workmen's Compensation (Agriculture) Convention, Nov. 12, 1921, RGB1. II 174 (1925);
Workmen's Compensation (Occupational Diseases) Convention, June 10, 1925, RGBi. II
509 (1928); Repatriation of Seamen Convention, June 23, 1926, RGBI. II 12 (1930);
Seamen's Articles of Agreement Convention, June 24, 1926, RGBl. II 987 (1930); Sickness
Insurance (Industry, etc.) Convention, June 15, 1927, RGB1. II 887 (1927); Sickness
Insurance (Agriculture) Convention, June 15, 1927, RGB1. II 889 (1927); Minimum Wage-
Fixing Machinery Convention, June 16, 1928, RGB1. II 375 (1929); Marking of Weight
(Packages Transported by Vessels) Convention, June 21, 1929, RGBI. II 940 (1933).
136 E.g., German-Bolivian Agreement concerning Free Election of Nationality, May 8,
1935, RGBI. II 498 (1935).
137 E.g., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights between Germany and
the United States, December 8, 1923, and its Revision, June 3, 1935, RGB1. II 743
(1935). It might. be of interest to note here that the United States courts and also the
Department of State have taken an opposite view and upheld the validity of this treaty
or at least the provisions of Article IV thereof. See Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947).
The view of the State Department is set forth in a letter to the Attorney General from
Acting Secretary of State, Joseph C. Grew, May 21, 1945, U.S. Supreme Court, Briefs,
p. 24-31, Clark v. Allen, supra.
138 E.g., Paris Convention concerning International Exhibitions, November 22, 1928,
RGBI. II 728 (1930).
139 E.g., German-Italian Convention on Cultural Cooperation, November 23, 1938,
RGBI. II 755 (1939).
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have been considered important because the multilateral treaties in
this field are of general interest and regulate international intellectual
cooperation in the fields of science, art, and religion. Bilateral German
pre-war treaties, however, were more or less expressions of a certain
ideology and propaganda, which did not fit into new conditions.
The sixth division is composed of treaties concerning international
political organizations of general kind. Under this group of treaties fall,
first, the Covenant of the League of Nations, which according to the
German official view has been abrogated by the war; second, interna-
tional arbitration treaties. If they have been in no way connected with
the League of Nations they will be considered as still in force. 40 In the
same way, the conventions regulating the system of free traffic on inter-
national waterways will be treated as still in force and not abrogated
by the war.' 4 1
The seventh type covered are commercial conventions. Multilateral
conventions in this group are considered as still in force,'42 but all bi-
lateral pre-existing German commercial conventions' are abrogated ac-
cording to the present official view, with some few exceptions. These
exceptions are, first, conventions concerning taxes, revenues, and
finance,144 which will be considered as still in force, but which require
adaptation to changed conditions after the war and, second, conven-
tions giving reciprocal privileges to the citizens of both countries to
establish themselves on the other's territory, to buy and inherit prop-
erty, and conduct affairs there,'145 and to carry on certain occupations-
for example, fishing in territorial waters.m 4
140 E.g, The Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes,
Oct. 18, 1907, RGBl. 11 5 (1910).
141 E.g., the General Act of Berlin of Feb. 26, 1885, respecting Navigation of the
Congo, RGBI. 215 (1885).
142 E.g., International Sugar Convention, March 5, 1902, with Additional Protocol,
RGB1. 7 (1903).
143 E.g., German-Greek Convention concerning the Amendment of the Convention of
Commerce and Shipping of March 24, 1928, October '1, 1938, RGBI. 837 (1938); German-
Dutch Convention concerning the Exchange of Goods, March 25, 1939, RGBI. 1I 632
(1939).
144 E.g., German-Danish Convention regarding the Prevention of Double Taxation in
the Fields of Income-tax, Corporation Tax, and "Property Taxes, December 16, 1938,
RGBI. I1 221 (1939); German-Italian Convention regarding the Prevention of Double
Taxation and the Regulation of Other Matters concerning Direct Taxation, October 31,
1925, RGBl. 11 1145 (1925), in effect as of January 1, 1951, through exchange of notes
on November 20, 1952, BGBl. II 986 (1952).
145 E.g., the Soviet-German Convention on Establishment and General Legal Protection,
October 12, 1925, RGB1. II 6 (1926).
146 E.g., Convention between Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland regarding
[Vol. 38
MODERN WAR AND TREATIES
In the eighth group are political treaties. All pre-existing treaties
concerning alliances, guaranty, and diplomatic relations are considered
by Germany as abrogated by war.147 The same is true in regard to arbi-
tration and conciliation treaties,148 and of treaties for the limitation
and reduction of armaments. 149 But the pre-existing peace treaties, to
the extent that their provisions have already been executed, will not be
considered as abrogated. Whether also the other parts of the peace
treaties which are not yet executed still are in force, and, if so, to what
extent, will be decided upon by the present German Government sepa-
rately in any special case. The same is true of conventions in regard to
special territories, 1 0 and of conventions regarding aliens and protection
of minorities."8 '
One more observation in regard to the German view is necessary.
Although, as already mentioned, Germany will regain "full authority" over
her treaty rights according to the Bonn Convention of May 26, 1952, it is
apparent that this Convention is not a final peace treaty. Furthermore,
as will be discussed subsequently, the Bonn Convention does not con-
tain any provisions concerning treaties. It is therefore expected that if
a final peace treaty with Germany comes into existence at some future
time, the views of the Bonn Government, as described above, will
have to be reconciled with those held by the victorious powers. What
these views are will be discussed in the following installment when deal-
ing with the Peace Treaties of the Second World War' 2
the Regulation of the Salmon Fishing in the River-basin of the Rhine, June 30, 1885,
RGBI. 192 (1886); Formally in effect as of January 1, 1952 between Germany and the
Netherlands, BGBi. II 435 (1952).
147 E.g., The Three Powers Pact between Germany, Italy and Japan, September 27,
1940, RGBI. II 279 (1940).
148 E.g., German-Luxembourg Arbitration and Conciliation Agreement, Sept. 11, 1929,
RGBI. II 83 (1931); German-Dutch Arbitration and Conciliation Agreement of May 20,
1926, RGBI. II 31 and 502 (1927), has been put in effect again as of January 1, 1952,
RGBI. II 435 (1952).
149 E.g., Protocol concerning the Modification of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement
of 1937, June 30, 1938, RGBI. II 914 (1938).
15o E.g, German-Danish Convention on North Schleswig, April 10, 1922, RGB1. 141
(1922); Rome Convention concerning the Issues arising out of the Annexation of the
Saar, Dec. 3, 1934, RGBI. II 126 (1935).
151 E.g., Agreement between Germany and the Republic of Columbia on Compulsory
Military Service, May 11, 1939, RGBI. HI 263 (1941).
152 So far as the United States Government is concerned the official view of the De-
partment of State does not seem to differ materially from the position taken by the Bonn
Government. See the letter to the writer by Charles I. Bevans, Assistant for Treaty Affairs,
Office of the Legal Adviser, dated June 8, 1953, and cited supra p. 344.
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